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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JEAl'lliETTE U. SWAN, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT 
DR. ROBERT H. LAMB 
DR. ROBERT H. LAMB and 
DR. DENNIS D. THOEN, 
Case No. 14823 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for alleged malpractice com-
mitted by the defendants in the performance of certain 
diagnostic procedures and surgery upon the back of the 
plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was submitted to the jury upon the 
theory of lack of informed consent, and the jury returned a 
verdict in favor of both defendants and against the plaintiff, 
no cause of action. Judgment was entered in favor of the 
defendants on the verdict. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek an affirmance of the judgment 
below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The pages of the transcript of the trial proceedings 
are not consecutively numbered. The pages of the transcript 
of each day of the trial are separately numbered. Therefore, 
in referring to the transcript of trial proceedings, we 
shall designate the day by a Roman numeral and the page by 
Arabic numerals, e. g. a citation to the first day of trial 
page 18 would be as follows: (Tr. I, p. 18.) 
THE FACTS 
The statement of facts contained in plaintiff's 
brief is not complete and is somewhat misleading; and we 
deem it necessary to supplement plaintiff's statement as 
follows: 
At the time plaintiff came under the care of 
defendants here, she was 68 years of age. In her early 40's 
she first experienced problems with her back. (Tr. IV, P· 
82.) This ultimately resulted in surgery which was performed 
in New York City in 1953. (Tr. I, p. 62; IV, p. 68.) Following 
- 2 -
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the surgery she enjoyed a good recovery and for a period of 
several years was symptom free. However, for several years 
before the date of the surgery giving rise to this case she 
had experienced increasingly severe back symptoms. (Tr. I, 
p. 62; IV, pp. 68, 95.) 
Her family physician was Dr. Robert Dalrymple, an 
internist. She was under treatment from him for high blood 
pressure and other medical problems. In March 1971, she 
complained to him of pains in her back. She made the same 
complaint in May of '71, and in August of 1972 she complained 
of low back pain and pain in the right lower extremity. (Tr. 
I, p. 32; IV, p. 67.) This was severe. Dr. Dalrymple 
recommended bed rest which is a form of conservative therapy. 
(Tr. I, p. 58.) He examined her again on September 12, 
1972. At that time she had severe pain in the low back and 
right leg. (Tr. IV, p. 92.) He concluded that she was sick 
enough to be put in the hospital for definitive diagnosis 
and treatment. She was admitted to St. Mark's Hospital on 
the same day. (Ex. lP; Tr. I, pp. 27, 29, 33-34, 60, 62, 
65.) At that time she had a lot of pain and spasm in her 
back and severe disease of the back, which was progressive. 
In his mind there was some question of spinal cord damage. 
- 3 -
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(Tr. I, pp. 34, 47, 60, 62-64.) He referred her to defe~c: 
Dr. Robert Lamb, orthopedist, for definitive care. Dr. L~ 
enlisted the assistance of defendant Dr. Dennis Thoen, a 
neurologist, in the diagnosis and treatment of plaintiff. 
(Tr. II, p. 90; III, p. 10.) 
After defendant doctors took plaintiff's history 
and performed a series of diagnostic tests and procedures, 
including a myelogram, they concluded that plaintiff's only 
hope for improvement was surgery. She had experienced socre 
aggravation of her symptons following the myelogram. (Ex. 1-: 
Tr. II, pp. 5-11, 21, 81-82, 86, 90-93, 113-114, 117; III. 
pp. 10-21, 46, 68-71.) There were risks inherent in both 
the myelogram and the surgery, but if she did not have the 
surgery she would follow a progressively downhill course 
with increasing symptoms and disabilities as time progressec 
(Tr. II, pp. 94; III, pp. 46, 68-71.) According to their 
testimonies, apparently believed by the jury, both defendan:; 
warned plaintiff and her husband that there were hazards i:; 
the procedures. (Tr. II, pp. 17, 21, 23, 94-95; III, PP· 2> 
22, 24, 70-71, 76, 97.) 
A spinal decompression surgical procedure was 
performed by Dr. Lamb, following which plai~tiff became 
- 4 - 1 
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paraplegic, for which injuries the present suit was brought. 
Plaintiff proceeded on two theories: (1) failure of defendant 
doctors to treat plaintiff in accordance with the standard 
of care prevailing in the community; and (2) failure to 
obtain the informed consent of the plaintiff to the procedures 
which they performed. (R. 2-5.) Plaintiff's family physician, 
Dr. Dalrymple, testified that he did not know of anything 
done or omitted to be done by defendant doctors which would 
be a departure from the standard of care prevailing in this 
community, and that he was familiar with the standard of 
care of orthopedic surgeons in the C0111IlUility. (Tr. I, pp. 
68-69.) 
In order to prove the standard of care in this 
community, plaintiff offered as an expert witness Dr. Peter 
Rocovich of Los Angeles, California. (Tr. III, p. 100.) Dr. 
~ocovich was a member of the Southern California Neurosurgical 
Society, American ~edical College [Association], California 
~edical Association, Los Angeles County Medical Association, 
~estern States Federation of Neurological Sciences. (Tr. 
III, p. 102.) It will be noted that he was not a member of 
a single professional organization which was national in 
scope except the American Medical [Association.]. That is 
- 5 -
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not a specialty association, and admission is to all physicia: .. 
in good standing in their profession, regardless of trainin g, 
experience, specialty, or competence. 
It is of particular importance that Dr. Rocovich 
had taken and "flunked" the board examinations in his own 
specialty, and therefore was not, and could not be board 
certified. (Tr. III, p. 103; IV, p. 21.) Moreover, he did 
not belong to any nationally recognized professional associati:: 
dealing with his specialty such as the Harvey Cushing Society, 
American College of Surgeons, American Academy of Neurosurgeon: 
and similar organizations. (Tr. IV, p. 22.) Apart from the 
American Medical Association, the only society he belonged 
to which was more than purely local in scope was the Western 
States Federation of Neurological Sciences. There was no 
evidence that any particular qualifications were necessary 
to obtain membership in that organization. 
By way of offer of proof, counsel for the defendant> 
established without contradiction, that Dr. Rocovich had 
never attended medical school in the State of Utah, had 
never taken any medical classes in the State of Utah, had 
not attended any medical lectures or seminars in the State 
of Utah, had no personal knowledge of the medical school at 
- 6 -
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the University of Utah, had never been licensed to practice 
in the State of Utah, had never undertaken to practice in 
the State of Utah, had never performed a surgical procedure 
in the State of Utah, had never "scrubbed in" at a Utah 
hospital with a Utah doctor to observe him perform surgery, 
had never observed a spinal decompression being done in the 
State of Utah, and had no personal knowledge concerning the 
standards of practice of medicine in this state. (Tr. IV, 
pp. 20-21.) 
There was no indication that he had ever repeated 
and passed the national board examination, or that he had 
ever remedied the deficiencies which had caused him to fail 
the initial examination. Not being board certified, he, of 
course, did not receive the publications of the speciality 
board of his own speciality. (Tr. IV, p.21.) 
He had absolutely no specialty training in ortho-
pedic surgery and did not subscribe to any orthopedic surgery 
periodicals. There are differences in practice between 
orthopedic surgeons and neurosurgeons in the field of spinal 
surgery. (Tr. IV, p. 22.) 
Dr. Rocovich admitted that he spends a substantial 
amount of his time in court testifying. He spent the entire 
- 7 -
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week of trial in Salt Lake City in connection with this 
case. He has testified in Utah before and has testified in 
Arizona on one or two occasions. He has testified on several 
occasions for attorney David Harney of Los Angeles, a specialii: 
in medical malpractice litigation. He also has a business 
relationship with attorney Harney. (Tr. IV, pp. 54-55.) He 
has previously testified at the request of the attorney for 
the plaintiff in this case in another case in Utah. In that 
case, he undertook to testify as to the standard of care of 
a hospital in the State of Utah. He was in Utah for several 
days on that occasion. (Tr. IV, pp. 58-59.) 
After considerable discussion·, consideration and 
debate, the trial judge determined not to accept the proffered 
testimony of Dr. Rocovich as to the standard of care in 
Utah. The judge set forth the reasons for his decision in a 
rather lengthy and thoughtful statement. See Tr. IV, PP· 3-
6 and 10-12. Judge Croft indicated that Dr. Rocovich had 
failed to establish to his satisfaction, familiarity with 
the degree of care and skill of other p~actitioners in the 
locality of Utah sufficient to qualify him to testify as to 
the standard of care of physicians in this state. (Tr. IV, 
p. 6.) 
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Dr. Robert Lamb is a specialist in orthopedic 
surgery. He is board certified and has been since 1953. He 
is also a member of the American Academy of Orthopedic 
Surgeons and a fellow of the American College of Surgeons. 
To become board certified it was necessary for him to pass 
both written and oral examinations. (Tr. II, pp. 2, 78.) 
Defendant, Dr. Thoen is likewise board certified 
in his speciality of neurology. As with Dr. Lamb, he obtained 
certification by taking and passing both written and oral 
examinations. (Tr. III, pp. 65-66.) 
Plaintiff offered no evidence other than the 
testimony of Dr. Rocovich concerning the alleged departure 
from the standard of care by the defendant doctors. Since 
the proffered testimony was not received, the court, of 
necessity, directed a verdict in favor of both defendants 
and against the plaintiff on the issue of defendants' 
negligence in the care and treatment of the plaintiff. The 
case was submitted to the jury on the single issue of whether 
plaintiff had given an informed consent to the diagnostic 
and surgical procedures which were performed upon her. Upon 
that issue, the jury found in favor of the defendants and 
returned a verdict in their favor, upon which judgment was 
entered. This appeal followed. 
- 9 -
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ARGUMENT 
The single issue before this court is whether the 
trial judge erred, or abused his discretion, in refusing to 
receive the proffered expert testimony of Dr. Peter Rocovich 
as to the standard of care by the defendant doctors in this 
case. 
However, plaintiff has somewhat fragmented her 
argument and in order to meet squarely the issues which she 
has raised, we have subdivided our argument. 
POINT I. THE LOCALITY RULE IS THE WELL 
ESTABLISHED RULE OF DECISION IN THIS COURT AND 
SHOULD NOT BE ABANDONED NOW 
Plaintiff opens her brief with a general discussion 
of the various standards which have been applied in evaluatini 
the skill and care of defendant physicians in malpractice 
cases. She then reviews the applicable Utah decisions and 
concludes that Utah has never committed itself to any of the 
four rules enumerated, namely the strict locality rule, the 
general neighborhood rule, the similar locality rule or the 
national standards rule. While it may be that the question 
has never been presented to the court quite as pointedly as 
it is here, the innumerable holdings of this court clearly 
demonstrate that this State is thoroughly cornmitted to the 
- 10 -
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locality rule. There may be some loose expressions in some 
of the cases referring to "the same or similar locality." 
For purposes of this case, we do not regard it as important 
whether the "strict locality," or "same or similar locality" 
rule is held to be applicable. 
Plaintiff then launches on a diatribe on the 
locality rule, describing it as "archaic", "outmoded," 
"unjust," and without any reason in fact. In support of her 
position plaintiff relies inter alia upon reports, surveys 
and other materials never offered or received in evidence, 
and not properly before the Court. 
We cannot agree with plaintiff that the locality 
rule has outlived its usefulness or vitality in the year 
1977, particularly in the western part of the United States. 
It cannot be denied that the doctors practicing in rural 
areas do not have the same advantages, and therefore, should 
not be held to the same standard of care, as doctors practicing 
in the urban centers. For example, doctors in the urban 
centers have ready access to consultation by specialists in 
the whole gamut of medical specialties. They have access to 
sophisticated diagnostic equipment, and to consultations by 
experienced specialists in all fields. They have access to 
- 11 -
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fast ambulance service, superior hospital facilities and 
extensive medical libraries. Rural doctors do not have the 
freedom to leave their practices in isolated communities for 
extended periods of time to attend seminars and supplementa~ 
training sessions. In many communities there is but one 
doctor, and when he is absent from the town there is no 
medical help available. 
Many recent decisions have reaffirmed the locality 
rule. See for example Lockart v. Maclean, (Nev.), 361P.2d 
670; Murphy v. Dyer, (10th Cir.), 409 F.2d 747; McCay 
v. Mitchell, (Tenn. App.) , 463 S. W. 2d 710; Burley v. Williams 
189 Neb. 484, 203 N.W.2d 454; Gandara v. Wilson, 85 N.M. 
161, 509 P.2d 1356; Goedecke v. Price, 19 Ariz. App. 320, 
506 P.2d 1105. A recent case from the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas gave thoughtful consideration to the entire problem, 
and we quote from it at length. See Gambill v. Stroud, 
(Ark.), 531 S. W. 2d 945. The following quotations are pertiner.: 
here: 
"The thrust of appellants' argument is that 
the rule set out in AMI 1501 is no longer 
applicable to modern medicine, because 
doctors practicing in small conununities 
now have the same opportunities and 
resources as physicians in large cities 
to keep abreast of advances in the medical 
- 12 - L 
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profession, due to availability of the 
Journal of the American Medical Assoc-
iation and other journals, drug company 
representatives and literature, closed 
circuit television, special radio networks, 
tape recorded digests of medical liter-
ature, medical seminars and opportunities 
for exchange of views between doctors from 
small towns and those from large cities 
where there are complexes of medical centers 
and modern facilities. 
"However desirable the attainment of this 
ideal may be, it remains an ideal. It was 
not shown in this case, and we are not 
convinced, that we have reached the time 
when the same postgraduate medical educa-
tion, research and experience is equally 
available to all physicians, regardless of 
the community in which they practice. The 
opportunities for doctors in small towns, of 
which we have many, to leave a demanding 
practice to attend seminars and regional 
medical meetings cannot be the same as those 
for doctors practicing in clinics in large 
centers. It goes without saying that the 
physicians in these small towns do not and 
cannot have the clinical and hospital 
facilities available in the larger cities 
where there are large, modern hospitals, and 
medical centers or the same advantage of 
observing others who have been trained, or 
have developed expertise, in the use of new 
skills, facilities and procedures, of 
consulting and exchanging views with spec-
ialists, other practitioners and drug experts, 
of utilizing closed circuit television, 
special radio networks or of studying in 
extensive medical libraries found in larger 
centers. 
"The rule we have established is not a strict 
locality rule. It incorporates the similar 
- 13 -
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community into the picture. The standard 
is not limited to that of a particular local-
ity. Rather, it is that of persons engaged 
in a similar practice in similar localities 
giving consideration to geographical location 
size and character of the community. Restate~ent 
of the Law, Torts 2d, 75 Comment g, §299A. 
The similarity of communities should depend not 
on population or area in a medical malpractice 
case, but rather upon their similarity from 
the standpoint of medical facilities, practices 
and advantages .... 
"Modern means of transportation and connnunication 
have extended boundaries but they have not 
eliminated them. See Sinz v. Owens, supra; 
Tvedt v. Haugen 70 N. D. 338, 294 N.W. 183, 
132 A.L.R. 379 (1940). The opportunities 
available to practitioners in a comm.unity are 
certainly matters of fact and not law and may 
be shown by evidence under our own locality rule. 
"Our locality rule is well expressed in Restatement 
of the Law, Torts 2d (1965) 73, §299A, viz: 
Unless he represents that he has greater 
or less skill or knowledge, one who under-
takes to render services in the practice of 
a profession or trade is required to exer-
cise the skill and knowledge normally 
possessed by members of that profession or 
trade in good standing in similar cormnunities. 
"It is fallacious to say that our locality ru~e 
permits a doctor in one place to be more negllg~ 
than one in another place. It is a matter of 
skill that he is expected to possess, i.e., ~he 
skill possessed and used by the members of his 
profession in good standing, engaged in the same 
type of practice in the locality in whic~ ~e 
practices, or a similar locality. The similar. 'ans 
locality rule pr even ts highly incompetent physici 
in a particular town from setting a standard of 
utter inferiority for the practice of medicine 
there .... 
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"One of the ideas suggested in appellants' argument 
is that a national standard of care should be 
observed. This is also unrealistic. We cannot 
accept that premise as a matter of law and we 
certainly do not take the theory that such a 
standard exists to be so well established that it can 
be judicially noticed. If it does factually exist, 
to any extent, or in any case, then certainly it 
can be shown by evidence. If the medical profession 
recognizes that there are standard treatments 
which should be utilized nation-wide this fact 
should be readily susceptible of proof under 
the similar locality rule because the skill and 
learning should be the same and all localities 
would be similar. See Annot, 37 A.L.R.3d 420, 
425; Peters v. Gelb, 303 A.2d 685 (Del. Super. 
1973); Rucker v. High Point Memorial Hospital, 
Inc., 285 N.C. 519, 206 S.E.2d 196 (1974); 
HUndley v. Martinez, 151 W. Va. 977, 158 S.E.2d 
159 (1967). The same may be said for any region 
exceeding the boundaries of a particular city or 
town .... 
* * * * * 
"It is also suggested that modern transportation 
and communications have so extended the borders 
of the locality as to bring the physician in 
a smaller community within the boundaries of a 
larger community where the appropriate treatment 
may be assured to a patient, even though the 
physician in the small town be unable to give it 
because of limited facilities or training. Here 
again, the appropriate community standard may 
require that these doctors send such patients as 
may be taken to such larger centers, but when 
this is not practicable, the small town doctor 
should not be penalized for not utilizing means 
or facilities not reasonably available to him." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Plaintiff complains that the locality rule is unfair 
and that it is impossible for plaintiffs to obtain the 
- 15 -
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testimony of local doctors in support of their claims even 
where meritorious. This is based on decisions from other 
jurisdictions, and reports and surveys from other times. 
Whatever the situation may be elsewhere in this country, and 
whatever it may have been in other times, it cannot be 
realistically contended that today, at least in the State of 
Utah, that a plaintiff cannot obtain the testimony of a 
properly qualified physician, familiar with the local standarc 
of care, to testify in support of a meritorious malpractice 
claim. 
Just one year ago the legislature of this state 
determined that there was a "crisis" in malpractice litigatioi 
in this state, and found it necessary in a Budget Session 
to enact a Health Care Malpractice Act. As the basis for 
the act, the legislature determined: 
"The legislature finds and declares that 
the number of suits and claims for damages 
and the amount of judgments and settlements 
arising from health care has increased great_1Y . 
in recent years." Sec. 78-14-2, U.C.A. (Emphasis 
added.) 
If plaintiffs generally were having any substantial 
d ·ff· 1 · f · d · t · to support meritorious i icu ty in in ing expert tes imony 
l islatura 
claims one must wonder why it was necessary for the eg · 
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almost as an emergency measure, to enact a malpractice act 
and to make the findings quoted above. 
Plaintiff places great reliance on the case of 
Douglas v. Bussabarger, 73 Wash.2d 476, 438 P.2d 829. In a 
stinging dissenting opinion in that case Justice Rosellini said: 
"Furthermore, I do not think that a plaintiff's 
attorney need be unduly handicapped by lack of 
information in testing the expertise of a 
medical witness. Medical knowledge has been 
written down and is accessible to the lawyer. 
If he confronts the witness with this knowledge 
I rather doubt that the doctor would allow his 
reluctance to incriminate a colleague to over-
come his concern for his own reputation as a 
man competent in his field and so profess 
ignorance of matters which reasonable comp-
etence would require him to know." 
At page 31 of appellant's brief it is said as follows: 
"This court cannot, without believing that Utah 
standards are justifiably lower than those of 
other states, countenance the application of a 
same general neighborhood rule in such a 
way as to affirm the lower court's decision 
to reject testimony from Dr. Rocovich." 
We emphatically disagree with this statement. 
It is not that Utah standards are lower than those of 
other states, but that they are higher than those demonstrated 
by Dr. Rocovich (as we shall hereafter more fully demonstrate) 
that makes the ruling of the lower court eminently correct. 
Appellant argues in opposition to the locality 
rule, that, "Close collegial relationships develop as doctors 
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attend the same seminars, conferences and symposia, belong 
to the same organizations. . . " etc. See appellant's brief 
page 32. The same argument could be advanced against a 
national standards rule with equal force. Board certified 
physicians in all of the specialities regularly attain and 
maintain collegial relationships, attend the same seminars, 
conferences and symposia, belong to the same organizations, 
etc. If this is a valid argument, it is a valid argument 
against a national standards rule as well as against a 
locality rule. 
In Blye v. Rhodes, (Va.) 222 S.E.2d 783, plaintiff's 
counsel made the same appeal as is being made here for an 
abandonment of the locality rule and adoption of a national 
standards rule. In rejecting that argument the Virginia Court 
I 
said at pp. 788-789: I 
"We acknowledge, as the plaintiff points out, 
that changes in communication, education, and 
attitudes have resulted in the abandonment 
by some jurisdictions of locality standards 
in favor of a national standard for determining 
medical malpractice of specialists. And we 
cannot deny the apparent merit of the argum~nts 
favoring change to a national standard applicable 
to specialists. 
"We are firmly of the view, however, that such 
a material change in the substantive law of 
Virginia should not be accomplished by the mere 
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brush of the judicial pen. The Virginia (same 
or similar community) standard is imbedded in 
the jurisprudential law of this Commonwealth; 
it has been long relied upon by lower courts, 
the legal and medical professions, and the 
public. If for no other reason, we reject the 
challenge for change because basic concepts 
of stare decisis dictate maintenance of the 
established law. 
"Sound considerations of policy also militate 
against a bench change of the present law. 
We have noted in Part I the critical national 
situation caused by proliferating medical 
malpractice litigation. If any changes in the 
substantive rules applicable to such litigation 
are to be made midstream of the controversy, the 
legislature and not this court should be the 
recipient of the pleas for change. " 
(Emphasis added.) 
Within the last year the Utah legislature has 
considered and legislated on this subject. Since it did not 
see fit to alter the present, well established locality 
rule, this court should not do so. 
POINT II. UNDER ANY STANDARD, DR. ROCOVICH 
DEMONSTRATED NO QUALIFICATIONS TO TESTIFY 
AGAINST DEFENDANT DOCTORS IN THIS CASE 
Even under a national standards rule, Dr. Rocovich 
demonstrated no qualifications to testify as an expert 
concerning the professional conduct of Dr. Lamb and Dr. 
Thoen. As we have previously demonstrated, Dr. Rocovich was 
not board certified in his own speciality, neurosurgery, 
much less in the specialities of the defendant doctors. He 
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did not belong to any national associations which had merit 
or specialty qualifications for membership. There is no 
showing that he subscribed to the publications of the nationa: 
speciality societies. In fact, it is affirmatively shown 
that Dr. Rocovich was not able to pass the test necessary 
for certification as a specialist in his own field. How, the: 
can he be qualified to testify as against the defendants in 
this case who are specialists in different fields? The very 
argument which plaintiff makes for a national standards 
rule, wholly defeats any claim that Dr. Rocovich was qualifiec 
to testify against the defendants in this case. 
As heretofore noted, this is not the first time 
that Dr. Rocovich has been offered as an expert in this 
state to testify on medical matters not involving his own 
speciality. In the case of Johnson v. L.D.S. Hospital, :lo. 
12970, Dr. Rocovich testified as an expert as to the standard 
of care of one of the local hospitals. That case was appealed 
to this court but pending appeal was settled between the 
parties. However, briefs were filed and an examination of 
d b the ' them will show that the same Dr. Rocovich was offere Y 
same attorney in that case as presently represents the 
appellant here. 
- 20 - J Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
I 
Plaintiff relies upon the case of Kronke v. Danielson, 
108 Ariz. 400, 499 P.2d 156. That case also involved Dr. 
Rocovich. That fact does not appear from the report of the 
case in Kronke, but reference to the case of Hoeffel v. 
Campbell, (Ariz. App.), 494 P.2d 777 will demonstrate that 
again the same Dr. Peter Rocovich is involved. In Kronke 
the court said: 
"To qualify an expert to express an opinion 
on what that standard of care is for the 
speciality of the defendant, the party 
offering the witness must establish the 
witness' knowledge and familiarity with 
the standard of care and treatment commonly 
practiced by physicians engaged in the same 
type of speciality as the defendant." 
On page 46 of her brief, appellant says: 
"As was stated by one court, 'A defendant 
should not be judged by a lower standard 
than he himself requests." 
We emphatically agree with this. This is exactly 
what the defendants ask in this case. Dr. Lamb, a board 
certified orthopedic surgeon, and Dr. Thoen, a board certified 
neurologist, should not be judged by the standards of a 
neurosurgeon who has flunked the certifying examination in 
his own specialty and who has demonstrated no knowledge 
whatsoever concerning the practice or standards in the State 
of Utah. Plaintiff has failed to cite a single case wherein 
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a doctor who is not board certified in his own speciality 
has been allowed to testify as to the standard of care or 
qualifications of a defendant who is board certified in a 
different speciality. The situation is ludicrous on its 
face. We submit that no such condition should ever be 
permitted to exist. Dr. Rocovich was wholly unqualified to 
testify as against these defendants and the court properly 
rejected his testimony. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL JUDGE HAS WIDE DISCRETION 
AS TO THE QUALIFICATIONS OF AN EXPERT WITNESS 
The trial court has discretion in the first instance 
to determine the qualifications of a proffered expert and in 
the absence of abuse of discretion his ruling will not be 
reversed. Plaintiff relies on the case of Riley v. Layton, 
(10th Cir.), 329 F. 2d 53, wherein a decision by Judge Ritter 
I 
· · el to receive the testimony of a San Francisco general practition.1 
I 
to testify as to the standard of care of a doctor practicing ' 
in Kanab, Utah was affirmed. The basis of the appellate court'; 
ruling, however, was that the testifying expert demonstrated 
some knowledge and experience of the methods of practice in 
similar localities, and that in the absence of a showing..Ei 
abuse of discretion in ruling on the qualifications of~ 
expert to testify, the ruling of the trial judge would~ 
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disturbed. In a later case, more like the case at bar, 
the same court sustained the ruling of a trial judge in 
rejecting the testimony of a nationally renowned expert in 
anesthesiology, in a case against a local obstetrician, because 
there was no showing that he was familiar with the local 
standard of care. Murphy v. Dyer, (10th Cir.), 409 F.2d 747. 
In Mccay v. Mitchell, et al, (Tenn. App.), 463 
S.W.2d 710, the court said at p. 718: 
"To qualify an expert witness in a 
malpractice action, it must appear he is 
familiar with the treatment and care and 
skill of practitioners in the locality in 
question .... 
"The qualification of a witness as an 
expert is a matter largely within the 
determination of the trial court. Appellate 
courts will not reverse the ruling of a 
trial judge on the issue unless it is shown 
the trial judge was clearly in error. Quinley 
v. Cocke, supra; McElroy v. State (1921) 146 
Tenn. 442, 242 S.W.2d 883. After a careful 
review of the rather lengthy and full testi-
mony produced to qualify Dr. Chodoff as an 
expert medical witness, we feel the Trial 
Judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing 
to allow this witness to testify as to the 
standards of care and skill required of 
orthopedic surgeons and general practitioners 
in Memphis, Tennessee. (Emphasis added.) 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully suggest that any relaxation of the 
traditional locality rule should be undertaken with the 
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utmost caution. Any such relaxation invites the testimony 1 
of foreign quacks and charlatans, who are nothing more than 
professional witnesses without either professional qualificaL: 
or conscience. If the doors are to be opened to the testimoni 
of professional witnesses from outside the state, to testify 
as to the standards of care of local professionals, care 
should be taken that such alleged experts are in fact what 
they purport to be, and that they do have those professional 
qualifications which would qualify them to pass judgment 
upon the professional conduct of local physicians. Such a 
showing is completely absent here. 
Under the traditional locality rule which this 
court has heretofore consistently followed, the testimonyof 
Dr. Rocovich was clearly inadmissible. Even under the most 
liberal rule, no proper foundation for the testimony of Dr. 
Rocovich was ever laid, and it would be equally inadmissible ' 
under that rule. Certainly there has been no showing of an 
abuse of discretion by the trial court in rejecting the 
profferred testimony of Dr. Rocovich. The judgment should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, j 
JENSEN & r! CHRISTENSEN, GARDINER, 
I 
By -----1 
Ray R. Christensen D jail' 
Attorneys for Respondent r. 
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and Respondent, Dr. Robert H. Lamb to W. Eugene Hansen, attorney 
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36 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and Rex 
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